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Institutions of International Law: How International Law 
Secures Orderliness in International Affairs 
Volker Roeben 
Abstract 
This article is a plea for adopting a reinvigorated, analytic perspective on contemporary 
international law, building on MacCormick’s powerful insights into law’s essential 
structure. The article proposes that international law as whole forms an institutional 
normative order. The idea of institutional normative order has certain conditions. These 
link a normative conception of international law with the means of achieving it. The 
article makes three arguments on these conditions. It first argues that the function of 
international law is to create order in the sense of orderliness for its principal users, 
States and international organizations. It then claims that international law establishes 
normative order through international rules that are binding from the viewpoint of 
States and international organizations. An international process of rule-making 
embedded in State practice turns norms into such rules. The process is being held as a 
bindingness-creating mechanism because it formalizes rules through recognized means 
and organizes collective consent to authorize them. States and international 
organizations then apply these rules by exercising international legal powers under a 
defeasible presumption of legality. Third, the article argues that this normative order 
becomes institutionalized. The institutions of international law are grounded in ideas 
about agencies, arrangements, and master-norms that integrate the mass of international 
rules and principles. The article exemplifies these arguments for UN-driven 
international law with the relating recent jurisprudence of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ), the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and Annex VII 
tribunals, and the Court of Justice of the European Union. The upshot of this idea of 
international law as institutional normative order is unity, or indeed a system. No part 
of international law can be seen outside of this context and hence the burden of 
argumentation is on those wishing to make the case for divergence. 
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I. Introduction 
Contemporary public international law has quantitatively and qualitatively much 
evolved over past periods.1 It is also increasingly specialized. The purpose of this article 
is to offer a fresh analytic perspective to help international lawyers make sense of their 
subject as a whole in this rapidly changing picture.2  
The article thus positions itself within a rich, recent literature. Much debated in that 
literature is the normative proposal that international law ought to be understood 
through the prism of constitutional principles.3 It been also been proposed to extend the 
positivist conception that law is based on a Grundnorm to international law.4 The 
suggestion that international law forms a system is legal-reconstructive.5 Critical 
approaches see international law as constructive of a particular political economy,6 or 
as argumentation.7 It could furthermore be seen as modes of making assertions about 
compelled conduct by States.8 Law and economics and rational choice explain 
international law through the utility of States.9 Pluralism places international law’s 
position within the growing ‘disorder of normative orders’ above the State.10 Finally, 
there are several process-based conceptions of international law such as the New Haven 
School, although these arguably are not very interested in the normativity of 
international law. Professors Thorpe and Brunnée have recently proposed to see 
international law as social interaction of States and non-State actors.11 They argue that 
international law as all law can only arise in the context of social norms based on shared 
understandings. International law is built, maintained, and sometimes destroyed 
through a continuing practice. Internal features, the so-called criteria of legality, are 
                                                   
 
1 Cf J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Geology of International Law – Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy’ 
(2004) 64 ZaöRV 547 (distinguishing ‘layers’ in the evolution of international law, the current layer 
being regulatory). 
2 The terms public international law and international law will be used interchangeably. 
3 J. Klabbers, A. Peters and G. Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law (OUP 2009). 
4 J. von Bernstorff, The Public International Law Theory of Hans Kelsen (CUP 2010).  
5 J. Crawford, Principles of Public International Law (8th edn OUP 2012). 
6 Cf TWAIL authors, A. Anghie and B.S. Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law and 
Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts’ (2003) Chinese J Int’l L 77. 
7 M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia (2nd edn CUP 2006) (hereafter referred to as From Apology) 
and The Politics of International Law (Hart 2011). In The Gentle Civiliser of Nations, The Rise and Fall 
of International Law 1870–1960 (CUP 2001), he advocates for a ‘culture of formalism’, further J. 
Klabbers, ‘Towards a Culture of Formalism? Martti Koskenniemi and the Virtues’ (2013) 27.3 Temple 
Int’l & Comp L J 417.  
8 D. Patterson, ‘Postmodernism’ in D. Patterson (ed.), Companion to the Philosophy of Law and Legal 
Theory (2nd edn Blackwell 2012) 375. 
9 From this common starting point, scholars have arrived at divergent conclusions. Compare, for instance, 
J. Trachtman, The Future of International Law (CUP 2011) with A.O. Sykes, ‘When is International 
Law Useful?’ (2013) 45.3 NYU J of Int’l L & Politics 723, and J. Goldsmith and R. Posner, The Limits 
of International Law (OUP 2007). 
10 P. Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law beyond Borders (CUP 2014); 
critical A. Galán and D. Patterson, ‘The Limits of Normative Legal Pluralism: Review of Paul Schiff 
Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law beyond Borders’ (2013) 11.3 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 783. 
11 J. Brunnée and S.J. Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law (CUP 2010). 
 
crucial to international law’s ability to inspire ‘fidelity’. This article accepts the point 
of Thorpe and Brunnée that international law ought to be conceptualized from the 
perspective of its users. In practical terms, these users at least predominantly remain 
States and international organizations.12 As Professor Klabbers has noted, international 
law references the internal viewpoint of States as opinio iuris.13 The internal viewpoint 
is commonly the starting point of positivist conceptions of law.  
The internal viewpoint is also the starting point of an institutional approach to law, 
originally formulated by the late Professor Neil MacCormick.14 In distinction from 
Hart’s rule of recognition positivism, he emphasized that law creates orderliness as a 
peculiar normative order that turns spontaneous norms into binding rules through 
certain formal processes. These rules then can be applied and become institutionalized. 
While MacCormick’s own work has focused on the law of the constitutional State, it 
can inspire the idea to see international law institutional normative order.15 This idea 
then has certain conditions that need to be met cumulatively. The first such condition 
is to make a normative argument about international law. The argument is to establish 
the point or function of international law.16 It is submitted that the point of international 
law is to secure international order in the sense of orderliness.17 It serves to secure the 
orderly conduct of States in international matters. The two further conditions concern 
how international law secures such orderliness: it does so by providing a specific 
normative rather than factual order and then by institutionalizing this normative order.  
First, international law provides normative order directing States in the conduct of 
international affairs. This requires distinguishing norms from international rules.18 
Norms regularize the international conduct of States. But international rules are distinct 
because they ought to be complied with, they are binding. International rules are 
recognizable for States because of their formal, conditional structure. An international 
process of rule-making produces such rules. This process serves to formalize and 
authorize international rules. Prominent means of formalizing international rules are 
treaties, but alternatives for formalizing norms into rules exist, such as resolutions of 
international organizations, texts issued by expert bodies, and judicial decisions. In the 
international process of legalization, formalization and authorization of norms into 
                                                   
 
12 The article uses these terms in the sense of aggregates. It hence does not need to take a position on the 
realist or critical argument that behind States and international organizations there are lawyers at work 
and that they generate a multiplicity of uses and agendas that cannot be reduced to a single use or agenda 
through the fiction of States or IOs. It is also true that TWAIL scholars have powerfully argued that in 
the Global South populations are at the ‘receiving end’ of international law––e.g. of the policies of 
international financial institutions and also international investment law. But the purpose of this article 
is analytic rather than normative. 
13 J. Klabbers, International Institutional Law (CUP 2011).  
14 N. MacCormick, Institutions of Law (CUP 2007). See also F. Schauer, ‘Institutions and the Concept 
of Law: A Reply to Ronald Dworkin (with Some Help from Neil MacCormick)’ (2009) University of 
Virginia Law School, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series No. 129. 
15 Ibid., at 35, 39. 
16 The descriptive definition becomes circular where it means that international law is the law of its 
subjects, see Crawford, Principles, at 115. 
17 MacCormick, Institutions, at 1–2, 281–5. 
18 The concept of rules features prominently in J. D’Aspremont, ‘The Idea of ‘Rules’ in the Sources of 
International Law’ (2014) 84 British Yb of Int’l L 103. This article focuses on the institutional process 
of making rules rather than ascertaining them. 
 
rules may occur at different points in time. Authorization itself indeed presents a 
paradox. It results primarily from collective consensuality, for instance by a treaty 
attracting the determined quorum of ratifying States for its entry into force. The 
individual consent authorizes the rule for this State, but it is neither sufficient nor 
necessary for the rule to become binding international law. This single international 
rule-making process produces international rules on several tiers. The substantive 
international rules are located on the primary tier. Further rules for application and 
enforcement fall on a secondary and tertiary tier. This indicates a shift in the application 
of international rules, away from relational obligations and rights and towards 
international legal powers that States hold and whose exercise is covered by a 
defeasible presumption of lawfulness.  
Second, this normative order is institutional. International rules become fully 
intelligible only when seen in their institutional context. This institutional context is 
formed by ideas about international law. The institutions of international law coalesce 
on the foundations, the agencies, arrangements for making international law, and 
master-norms that give impetus and direction to the rule-making process. Sustainable 
development, international security and human dignity have emerged as such master-
norms. When these master-norms are underpinned by machinery, then international law 
becomes fully institutionalized. 
The article’s ambition is to present a conceptual proposal about international law. 
Yet it also aims to test this proposal against the reality of UN-driven international law 
and relating recent jurisprudence, comprising the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), UNCLOS Annex VII 
tribunals, and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).  
The remainder of the article develops the idea that international law is an 
institutional normative order in three parts. It deals with the condition that international 
law forms a normative order in two steps. Part I demonstrates that international rules 
that steer States’ conduct are formalized and authorized through a single rule-making 
process. Part II demonstrates that international rules are applied in a structured manner, 
by States and international organizations exercising legal powers under a defeasible 
presumption of lawfulness. Part III then turns to the institutions of international law. It 
argues that international law generates institutional normative order because it is able 
to formulate ideas about its own foundations and the common interest, ultimately of 
humanity. The conclusions point out that this institutional normative order conception 
comprises all UN driven rules and principles of international law. It also points out 
some methodological implications. 
II. International Law as Normative Order: Formalizing and 
Authorizing International Rules 
This part takes up the condition that international law forms a normative order. Central 
to this normative order is the concept of international rules. Art. 38 (1) of the ICJ Statute 
refers to international ‘rules’ in the context of setting out the sources of international.19 
                                                   
 
19 Art. 38 (1) (a) Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 
24 October 1945) 145 BSP 832 (ICJ Statute): ‘international conventions, […] establishing rules’; and 
Art. 21 (1) (b) ICC Statute: ‘rules of international law’ (emphases added). 
 
So what characterizes a rule of international law? Taking a cue from MacCormick, the 
broader category of norm should be the starting point in answering this query.20 The 
convergent conduct of States on an international matter over time will result in the 
formation of a norm, which will attract compliant conduct in turn. International rules 
are distinct from norms, however, because they compel conduct; they ought to be 
complied with. In the eyes of States and international organizations, international law 
is immediately recognizable as part of the broad human endeavour of law because it 
follows the conditional format of a rule: a set of criteria is connected with certain 
consequences. Of course, international law is decentralized and lacks central organs for 
producing such rules, with the limited exception of the UN Security Council. It does 
have, however, a rule-making process. This process is embedded in State practice and 
affirmed every time that States make use of it. It comprises the two distinct elements of 
formalizing and of authorizing an international rule. These two elements may coincide. 
But it is also possible that a norm is first formalized as rule and receives authorization 
only at a later stage.  
The following separately discusses formalization (1) and authorization by States (2) 
and also by international organizations (3) and by the international community of States 
(4). Such formalization and authorization produce binding international rules, 
principles and standards (5).  
1. Formalizing the Rules of International Law 
Formalization of international rules is a process, not an occurrence.21 The starting point 
is a social norm. Where such a norm has attracted compliant behaviour by States, it 
reaches a tipping point at which it can be formalized as a rule. The uptake is often 
initiated by the UN General Assembly.22 Through a resolution, it formalizes the norm 
and launches the further steps in the process of turning it into a formal rule.23  
The catalogue of Art. 38 (1) (a)–(d) of the ICJ Statute does not just name sources for 
the ascertainment of existing law. It defines preferred means for giving the norm the 
                                                   
 
20 Under Art. 38 (1) (b) ICJ Statute, States must be convinced that a general practice is legally motivated. 
This conviction (opinio iuris) is empirical. 
21 See M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’ (1998) 52.4 
Int’l Org 887, at 896, 901 (norm-affirming events). 
22 For instance, Written Statement of the EU, Request for an Advisory Opinion submitted by the Sub-
Regional Fisheries Commission (23 November 2013) ITLOS Case No. 21 (flag State control over IUU 
fishing starting with UNGA resolution). 
23 Examples abound. The norm against the use of chemical weapons finds a formal embodiment in rules 
of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on their Destruction (opened for signature 13 January 1993, entered into force 29 April 
1997) 1974 UNTS 45, and again by UN Security Council Resolution 2118 (27 September 2013) on the 
removal of chemical weapons from Syria. The norm against commercial whaling is formalized in the 
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (signed 2 December 1946, entered into force 10 
November 1948) 161 UNTS 72, Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan, New Zealand Intervening) 
(Judgment) [2014] ICJ Rep 226, at paras 42–48, and Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan, New 
Zealand Intervening) (Declaration of Judge Keith) [2014] ICJ Rep 336. 
 
form of a rule.24 These means shape the rule to a specific degree of explicitness. Treaties 
usually produce fully explicit rules laid down in writing.25  
Yet there is no numerus clausus of means for formalizing rules. Alternatives to treaty 
exist.26 Resolutions adopted by international organizations may serve as such 
alternative. Expertise-based texts are another.27 Courts and tribunals developing an 
acquis judiciaire can formalize an international rule.28 The 2014 M/V ‘Virginia G’ case 
uses a synthesis of domestic legislation to formalize an international rule. The ITLOS 
there referenced the practice of coastal States to formulate a rule filling the gap in Art. 
73 of the UNCLOS on bunkering in the exclusive economic zone.29  
A synopsis of consistent State practice also formalizes rules. To compensate for the 
lack of a textual basis, custom relies on judicial or expert verification.30 The rule then 
determines what counts as practice,31 while actual negative practice can be disregarded 
where it is overlain by argumentative adherence to the rule.32 State practice also has 
rule-making capacity in the dynamic development of treaties.33 General principles 
produce international rules from the converging national legal orders, and they also 
need to be verified. 
2. Authorization 
Formalization is necessary but not sufficient for a binding international rule. This 
requires authorization. International law does not carry its authority in itself, but it is 
authorized by a political community that controls its content.34 The power to authorize 
international law rests, primarily, with States. States form political communities that 
                                                   
 
24 See J. D’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law. A Theory of the Ascertainment 
of Legal Rules (OUP 2011) (sources as means for the ascertainment of rules). 
25 Art. 38 (1) (a) ICJ Statute: ‘establishing rules expressly recognized’ (emphasis added). 
26 Further, R. Wolfrum and V. Röben (eds), Developments of International Law in Treaty Making 
(Springer 2005). 
27 The WTO Appellate Body has effectively made the Codex Alimentarius the standard for presumed 
compliance with the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, WTO EC-Trade Description of Sardines 
– Report of the Appellate Body (26 September 2002) WT/DS231/AB/R, DSR 2002:VIII, 3451. 
28 The People’s Republic of Bangladesh v. The Republic of India (Award) (7 July 2014), at para. 339 
(Art. 38 (1) (d) ICJ Statute) (hereinafter Bay of Bengal Arbitration). 
29 M/V ‘Virginia G’ (Panama v. Guinea-Bissau) (Judgment) (16 April 2014) ITLOS Case No. 19, at para. 
253. 
30 D. Regan, ‘International Adjudication’ in S. Besson and J. Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of 
International Law (OUP 2010) 225, at 228. 
31 For instance, relevant practice for State immunity is primarily formed by the decisions of national 
courts and for acquisition of territory by certain effective exercises of State power (effectivités). Frontier 
Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Niger) (Judgment) [2013] ICJ Rep 44, at para. 78. 
32 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) 
(Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14.  
33 Art. 31 (3) (a) and (b) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (concluded 23 May 1969, entered 
into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT).  
34 MacCormick, Institutions, 39–61.  
 
authorize international law.35 Such a community can be two States, it can also be a 
multitude of States or the ‘international community of States’ (as a whole). 
International law is hence inevitably authorized collectively, through at least two States.  
Professor Brunnée has pointed out that treaties present a paradox.36 Treaties require 
consensuality, that is, independent approval of States to become binding international 
law. But each approval on its own does not suffice to bring the treaty into existence. 
There must be matching decision(s), in the case of a bilateral treaty that of another 
sovereign or in the case of a multilateral treaty of several other sovereigns. This paradox 
is key to conceiving of authorization of international rules. Authorization of 
international law lies in the hands of several States.37  
The authorization of treaties is collective in the sense that the support of several 
States is indispensable for the rule to become binding at all. Collective consent provides 
primary authority in the sense that it brings the international rule into existence. The 
collective authorization can be provided by groupings of States. A representative group 
of States may authorize a rule for the entire international community of States.38 That 
is evidently so for multilateral treaties. Multilateral treaties determine the quorum of 
accessions for their entry into force. This quorum is the abstractly determined critical 
mass of States for the matter at hand, but not any concrete individual State. The 
individual consent of each State supplies secondary authority that determines the 
geographical scope of the rule. Even this role of individual reciprocal consent has been 
diminishing, as treaties may compel conduct by a party also towards non-treaty third 
States. Collective authorization also pertains to customary international law, with only 
the persistent objector rules providing for individual (non-)consent.  
3. International Organizations 
In addition to States, international organizations and, increasingly, the organized 
meetings of the parties to a treaty have authority, even beyond the express or implied 
authorization through the constitutive treaty––functionalism––.39 Thus, resolutions and 
decisions of international organizations have the legal effect that the members have 
provided for through the constitutive treaty, expressly or impliedly.40 That includes 
                                                   
 
35 The article here considers States and international organization as political entities. In Part IV it will 
show that international law, in turn, is capable of institutionalizing both States and international 
organizations as its agencies. 
36 J. Brunnée, ‘Treaties’ in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
(OUP Oxford 2008–) <http://www.mpepil.com/> (accessed 15 April 2019). 
37 International law recognizes unilateral acts as binding, see Obligation to Negotiate Access to the 
Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile) (Judgment) (1 October 2018) General List No. 153, at para. 146. But 
the bindingness of unilateral acts in turn is grounded in an international rule. 
38 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark, Federal Republic of 
Germany/Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep 4 (there applied to rules of international customary law). 
39 UNGA Res 60/1 ‘2005 World Summit Outcome (16 September 2005), paras 138–149, launched the 
ongoing process of legalizing the Responsibility to Protect that comprises mandatory measures of the 
UN Security Council and State practice. 
40 Art. 25 and Chapter VII of the UN Charter (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 
1 UNTS 16; Art. III International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (signed 2 December 1946, 
entered into force 10 November 1948) 161 UNTS 72.  
 
making rules binding for States without their (explicit) consent.41 The so-called tacit-
consent procedure substitutes collective decision-making for consent of all members in 
this manner.42 Beyond this functionalism of conferred competences, there is a shift 
towards own institutional authority. The ILC Reports on Art. 31 (3) (a) and (b) of the 
VCLT recognize the role of meetings of parties for the dynamic development of the 
underlying treaties.43 Decisions of such meetings, which institutionalize collective 
membership, have authority. They enrich the normative content of the treaty.  
This shift towards institutional authorization is reflected in the recent international 
jurisprudence. Prominently, in Whaling in the Antarctic,44 the ICJ accepted that 
recommendatory resolutions adopted by an international organization at unanimity gain 
legal significance as aid in interpretation of the constitutive treaty.45 But even non-
unanimous resolutions carry authority. They will have a legal effect of a taking-into-
account-type because of the general duty of all members to cooperate with the 
international organization.46 In Pulp Mills, the ICJ has furthermore indicated that 
international bodies may issue texts under an own institutional authority.47 The text at 
issue was UNEP’s 1987 Goals and Principles for Environmental Impact Assessments. 
The principles not only formalize a rule-book that can be applied. The Court accords 
legal weight to them because UNEP was the body entrusted by the international 
community of States with safeguarding the shared value of environmental protection. 
The Court then referred to the principles to concretize the customary international law 
rule that States carry out an EIA for projects with a significant transboundary impact. 
The Advisory Opinion in Chagos is the culmination of this jurisprudence. There the 
Court found the UN Charter to entrust the UN General Assembly with broad oversight 
over the implementation of the principle of self-determination.48 In the exercise of this 
oversight function, the UN General Assembly could then pass resolutions for the 
binding rule that former colonies must gain their independence in full territorial 
integrity. The Court hence recognizes that the authority of an international body that 
rests on its functions for global governance, rather than narrower and specific 
competences, underpins its resolutions with binding force.49 
                                                   
 
41 J. Brunnee, ‘Legislation’ in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
(OUP Oxford 2008–) <http://www.mpepil.com/> (accessed 15 April 2019). 
42 N. Krisch, ‘The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of Global Public Goods’ (2014) 108 
AJIL 1. 
43 UN ILC ‘First Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to Treaty 
Interpretation by Georg Nolte, Special Rapporteur’ (19 March 2013) UN Doc A/CN.4/660. 
44 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Intervening) (Judgment). 
45 The technical basis advanced by the Court is the VCLT, Art. 31 (3) (a) or (b), on subsequent agreement 
to an interpretation or subsequent practice establishing an agreement of the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty. Whaling in the Antarctic, at para. 83. 
46 Whaling in the Antarctic, at para. 83: ‘The Court however observes that the States parties to the ICRW 
have a duty to co-operate with the IWC and the Scientific Committee and thus should give due regard to 
recommendations calling for an assessment of the feasibility of non-lethal alternatives.’ 
47 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) (Judgment) [2010] ICJ Rep 14, at para. 205. 
48 Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965 (Advisory 
Opinion) (25 February 2019) General List No. 169. 
49 Para. 139: ‘[T]he Court, in determining the obligations reflected in these resolutions, will have to 
examine the functions of the General Assembly in conducting the process of decolonization.’ 
 
4. The International Community of States 
This ‘international community of States’ is, among other things, a concept for thinking 
about the collective authorization of international rules. The literature offers a range of 
definitions.50 A systems theory guided approach, favoured here, would locate the 
concept in the international political system. It then describes the central organization 
of that system. This organization is the aggregate of States and each State is included 
eo ipso.51 Non-State actors are not but can be admitted.52 The point of this organization 
is to enable iterative cooperation on matters of common interest.53 That cooperation is 
aided by shared values, even though these may be thinner than within each State.54 The 
collaboration between States to respond to their political priorities may then lead to 
international rule-making.55 The international community of States has unlimited 
access to international law, on the basis of the principle that most international law is 
dispositive and hence can be changed where priorities change. It starts the above 
described rule-making process, for instance through a UN General Assembly 
resolution.56 The resulting international rules then evidence the values of that 
community. 
Cooperation is generally an expectation that leaves the choice of means to States.57 
There is no general duty for States to cooperate, although area-specific cooperation 
duties exist.58 States may enshrine in international law a specific obligation to 
cooperate, or to negotiate and even to negotiate towards a certain objective.59 However, 
general international rules enable cooperation.60 The Vienna Conventions enable safe 
communication and hence cooperation between States.61 Their protection is therefore a 
                                                   
 
50 These cannot be discussed in detail here. Influential is T. Franck, Fairness in International Law and 
Institutions (OUP 1995), at 12 (‘a community is defined by having a corpus of rules that it deems 
legitimate and by having agreed on a process that legitimizes the exercise of authority’). 
51 B. Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest’ (1997) 250 Recueil des Cours 229, at 233 
(‘international community of States’). 
52 Crawford, Principles, at 126. 
53 A. Hurrell, On Global Order (OUP 2007), at 95–117 (‘complex global governance’ to refer to 
managerial element of the present international political system). 
54 Further M. Hakimi, ‘Constructing an International Community’ (2017) 111 AJIL 317. 
55 For the institutional economics of international cooperation see Trachtman, Future, at 24–31. 
56 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) (Judgment) [2012] 
ICJ Rep 422, at para. 99. 
57 UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’ (24 
October 1970) emphasizes international cooperation, yet does not define it. 
58 Access to the Pacific, at para. 163 (discussing Art. 2 (3) UN Charter). 
59 See Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to 
Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom) (Preliminary Objections) (Judgment), 
concerning applications brought by the Marshall Islands against nine States for alleged failure to fulfil 
their obligation to negotiate under the treaty to end the nuclear arms race at an early date.  
60 Trachtman, Future, at 255 (distinguishing enabling, constraining and supplemental constitutional 
functions of international law). 
61 Namely the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations (done 18 April 1961, entered into force 24 
April 1961) 500 UNTS 95, and on Consular Relations (concluded 24 April 1963, entered into force 19 
March 1967) 596 UNTS 261, and the customary law on the immunity of States and certain State organs.  
 
priority of the international community.62 These cooperation-enabling rules are 
complemented by the foundational principles of the UN Charter constraining States 
acting unilaterally to advance their interests. The categorical prohibition of the use of 
force by Art. 2 (4) UN Charter precludes States from pursuing change through military 
pressure.63 Sovereign equality, Art. 2 (1) UN Charter, precludes unilateral action 
undermining cooperative approaches.64 Sovereign immunity prevents States from 
pursuing change interests though domestic law pressures.65 The ICJ judgment in 
Jurisdictional Immunities reflects this role of sovereign immunity in stabilizing 
cooperative approaches and outcomes, in this case the final agreement reached on war 
reparations when challenged by unilateral action based on human rights. Essentially, 
treaty-based normative hierarchies serve the same purpose of stabilizing collective 
cooperation, by constraining individual States or groups of States from setting rules that 
deviate from the multilateral treaty. Art. 103 UN Charter is a well-known instantiation. 
The arbitral tribunal in the South China Sea case has powerfully reinforced this function 
of treaty-internal normative hierarchy for Art. 311 UNCLOS, setting aside all rules on 
the law of the sea that might empower States unilaterally to claim ocean resources and 
conflict with the concepts by which the UNCLOS allocates those resources.66 
The international community of States has been consolidating its position within the 
international rule-making process. This consolidation translates into exclusive 
competence over certain matters. Ius cogens is such a matter. The international 
community exclusively may confer peremptory status on an international rule.67 As 
such, it becomes a conflict rule determining the validity of any, bilateral or multilateral 
treaty-based rule.68 The peremptory rule thus precludes any contracting out by States. 
The international community is also exclusively competent to regulate spaces beyond 
national jurisdiction, the deep seabed, the high seas, and outer space. Other global 
public goods fall under the proviso that the matter is of common concern. That is 
namely the case for the global climate. The competence of the international community 
is not exclusive but rather concurrent: the collectively agreed rules permit bilateral 
treaties, but preclude any deviation. 
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5. Rules, Principles and Standards 
There is thus a single rule-making process for international rules. The resulting rules 
fall on several tiers, though. There are substantive rules to steer conduct on a primary 
tier, rules on application on a secondary tier and rules on enforcement on a third tier. 
Standards are open rules that serve to incorporate external events.69  
This process produces international rules that are general and abstract. They are 
general in the sense that that they have the same content for all States and abstract in 
the sense that they apply to indeterminate instances. Reservations to treaties break this 
generality, by creating exceptions for one State party in relation to all others. 
Multilateral treaties often seek to ensure generality of their rules for all parties by 
prohibiting reservations. The geographical scope of application of each rule then of 
course varies.70 It can be bilateral, regional or universal. Multilateral treaties aspire to 
establish quasi-universality. Customary international rules are universal by default.71  
International rules are supplemented by principles. Principles are also binding and 
hence distinct from norms. They are distinct from rules in that they are imbued with 
unlimited application while the scope of application of a rule is limited.72 International 
law uses the term ‘principle’ in three senses.73 The principle may establish a broad 
synthesizing conception;74 it may indicate a larger idea of as yet incomplete 
realization;75 or, the principle may be a rationale from which rules can be deduced.76 
The UN Charter, in Art. 2, enshrines principles in the sense of rationales. In 
Jurisdictional Immunities, the ICJ qualified these principles as ‘constitutive’ for 
international law. 77 It there referred to the principle of sovereign equality (Art. 2 (1) 
UN Charter) as the rationale of the customary law of State immunity. In Documents 
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Seized, the Court used the principles of peaceful settlement of disputes and equality of 
States to protect the integrity of legal proceedings between States against interference 
by either party, overcoming the lack of extant procedural rules for inter-State disputes.78  
III. Applying and Enforcing International Rules 
As international rules are general and abstract, they must be applied in any given 
instance. McCormick has shown that normative order comprises rules, but also a 
structured process of applying these rules. This part hence moves from international 
rules to analysis of their application of international law. It first clarifies that the rules 
of international law are of either discretionary or strict application. It then explores that 
the obligation is a vehicle for applying a rule, to which legal power is an alternative. 
Finally, the part demonstrates that international courts are making increasing use of the 
concept of international legal powers that States hold and exercise under a defeasible 
presumption of lawfulness.  
1. Strict and Discretionary Application 
A fundamental distinction, then, is between strict and discretionary application of 
international rules. An international rule is for strict application if States must apply the 
rule in all instances and have no choice. Application is discretionary where a State is 
free to make the initial decision to apply the rule. This distinction corresponds to the 
categories of law-making treaties and contract-making multilateral treaties. That 
categorization primarily relates to the content of treaties, with the former comprising 
treaties on a public interest of the international community of States and the latter 
referring to treaties to establish reciprocal exchanges.  
But those treaty categories also reflect critical differences in application. Law-
making treaties contain strictly applicable rules, while a contract-making treaty 
presupposes the exercise of discretion. The UN Charter, the UN Law of the Sea 
Convention, UN human rights treaties, and also WTO-based world trade law are law-
making treaties laying down strictly applicable rules. Of the contract-making type are 
the Vienna Conventions on diplomatic and consular relations, which leave it to each 
party to decide whether and with whom it wants to enter into a relation governed by the 
Convention. However, that initial discretionary decision then triggers further rules that 
are to be applied strictly, for instance on diplomatic immunity etc.79  
2. From Rights and Obligations to Defeasible Powers 
Whether strict or discretionary, application of a rule is different from the rule itself. 
Application is about individualizing the general and abstract international rule for a 
specific actor in a situation. This requires a constructive unit through which his 
individualizing function can be performed. The obligation in international law is such 
a unit. In Access to the Pacific, the ICJ has confirmed that obligation in international 
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law only arises under an extant rule of international law.80 The obligation defines a 
concrete legal relationship: the obligated State owes a specific conduct to another State, 
to several States in the case of erga omnes (partes) obligations,81 or to the international 
community. To the international obligation can correspond the right of another State to 
demand that the obligation be performed.  
International rules are traditionally applied through this relational unit, expressed in 
the obligation of one State and the right of another. This is conventional for bilateral 
treaties. But there is no reason to deny that multilateral treaties also create obligations 
and the right for each party to demand of any other that it perform its obligations. 
Sovereignty under the UN Charta and customary international law can also be 
construed as the right of each State to demand that all others meet their obligation to 
respect its jurisdiction.82 This relational structure of obligation and right is continued 
into the reaction to the ‘primary’ obligation going unfulfilled. In such case, a 
‘secondary’ obligation becomes incumbent on that State to cease the violation and to 
make reparation.83 To such secondary obligation corresponds the right of the injured 
State to invoke those obligations for itself, and a right of non-injured other States to 
invoke those obligations for the benefit of a collective interest a law-making treaty 
protects.84 
This relational unit of obligation and rights gives international law a subjective, 
quasi-contractual and static appearance. Yet, obligation and right is merely one of 
several possible units for applying international rules. In thinking about alternatives, 
the international rule remains the principal reference. International rules enable States, 
as much as they constrain them. They confer international legal powers where such 
power is the capability of a State of altering the legal situation of other actors. States 
hold such international power towards other States. They may also hold it towards a 
private party.  
A State in exercising such power produces decisions covered by a presumption of 
lawfulness. This presumption of lawfulness is defeasible, however. The principal 
ground of defeasibility remains that the decision does not conform to the power-
conferring rule. This is not new. In Certain German Interests in Polish Silesia, the 
Permanent Court of International Justice had already affirmed that it could review 
national legislation for its conformity with a State’s international obligations.85 Yet, 
contemporary international law now recognizes supplementary grounds of 
defeasibility. Such grounds results from the constraints that the international rule of law 
and human rights place generally on States when exercising any of their powers.86 
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These constraints entail the duty to disregard facts established unlawfully through their 
violation.87 
The presumption of lawfulness can be defeated in several fora. The default forum 
remains each State, under the rule that it is for the sovereign to auto-apply international 
law including through its domestic courts. This forum is increasingly overlain by 
international fora with jurisdiction to settle disputes through decisions capable of 
becoming res iudicata. The ICJ remains the only international court with general 
jurisdiction. But it is complemented by a range of courts and tribunals with jurisdiction 
over particular international law. These courts and tribunals have begun to fulfil an 
international judicial function.88 The international judicial function is organizationally 
specialist, but procedure and remedies are converging.89 The conceptual problems of 
adjudication arising are not substantially different from those on the national plane, 
including the judicial review of State decisions potentially resulting in a declaration of 
invalidity.90 Incidental review of decisions by State officials against the fundamental 
prohibitions on waging wars on aggression and committing genocide and crimes 
against humanity takes place through international criminal courts.91 The international 
judicial function remains based on consent.92 The constitutive role of consent for 
adjudication has been diminishing marginally, though. For instance, advisory 
proceedings do not require consent, not even of directly concerned States,93 while 
increasingly settling important legal questions. The presumption of a lawful decision 
can also be defeated in non-judicial fora, such as the UN. Such executive control is 
distinguished from judicial control by the fact that it does not generate res iudicata.94  
The concept of rule-application through international legal powers can be transferred 
to international organizations. These, under their constitutive treaty, hold limited 
powers over their Member States and sometimes also over individuals.95 Decisions 
taken in the exercise of such powers may be defeasible before the organization’s own 
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court.96 Or they may be defeasible, as an incidental question, before an external court 
or tribunal.97  
3. Defeasible Legal Power and International Judicial Review 
The defeasible international legal power is not just a theoretical construct. As will be 
demonstrated, international courts and tribunals are making use of the concept to 
structure the judicial review of whether a certain State conduct has been internationally 
lawful.  
Prominently in Whaling in the Antarctic, the ICJ reviewed the power that Art. VIII 
of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling confers on States to 
permit the taking whales for scientific purposes for its proportionate exercise by 
Japan.98 In Obligation to Prosecute, the Court clarified the powers of a State under the 
UN Convention against Torture regarding private parties. It then reviewed the (non-
)exercise of that power.99 In Navigational and Related Rights, the Court reviewed the 
power of a State party under a bilateral treaty to regulate private commerce on a 
navigable river, interpreting it in the light of subsequent multilateral law 
development.100 And in Mutual Assistance, the Court reviewed a State’s exercise of an 
international legal power regarding another State under a bilateral extradition treaty.101 
The ITLOS, adjudicating under the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention, also refers 
to defeasible powers. For instance, the 2014 M/V ‘Virginia G’ case involved the 
regulation of offshore bunkering for fishing vessels. The Tribunal first determined that 
the Convention conferred such power on the coastal State.102 It then reviewed the 
coastal State’s exercise of that power, including the proportionality of any enforcement 
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action.103 In its SRFC Advisory Opinion, ITLOS indicates that Parties’ exercise of their 
powers under UNCLOS will be subject, generally, to their responsibility for the 
achieving the broader and evolving objectives of the Convention.  
4. Enforcing International Law 
In addition to rules and application, normative order is concerned with enforcement. 
The bindingness of international rules would be called into question were there to be 
no reaction to non-compliance. Enforcement is such a reaction, to bring about 
compliant behaviour through the exercise of an international legal power. Enforcement 
powers for States do not inhere in the substantive international rules, not even those of 
ius cogens quality.104 They must be conferred by separate rules.  
Such enforcement powers are conferred by the customary law of State responsibility, 
under which non-compliance by a State creates powers for other States to bring about 
compliance by the offender. This is the function of countermeasures another State may 
take.105 The law of treaties empowers one State Party to terminate a treaty in cases of 
material breach by another.106 Such reciprocal enforcement works well for rules that 
provide for the exchange between States of concessions or other advantages. These 
rules are self-enforcing in the sense that non-compliance can be addressed effectively 
by the reaction of another State Party. Much of international trade law is in that sense 
self-enforcing, although it makes suspending compliance subject to quasi-judicial 
authorization.107  
By contrast, treaty-specific enforcement mechanisms are needed for non-reciprocal 
international rules. These mechanisms range from incentives for compliance to 
sanctions for non-compliance.108  
But enforcement may also recombine rules from different subject-matters of 
international law. For instance, human rights law provides enforcement for 
international environmental law that is deficient in its own enforcement. This turns 
private parties into enforcers of international law.109 
IV. Institutions of International Law  
International rules constitute international law as a normative order. This normative 
order then becomes institutionalized. The term ‘institution’ requires some clarification. 
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There is a more technical use of legal institution that international lawyers will often 
have in mind when they refer to institutions.110 This contrasts with broader 
understandings of the term in the literature.111  
This article adopts such a broader understanding. As understood here, institutions 
articulate ideas about international law.112 Institutions, then, are schemes of 
international law’s own making. They ensure the autonomy of international law. This 
autonomy extends to the very subjects of international law. International law is hence 
able to institutionalize both States and international law. It can institutionalize the 
foundations of its own functioning.  
Yet institutions do not generate law by themselves. Rather, the institutional idea 
must be turned into law to be operational through the usual rule-making process. The 
following discussion of the institutions of international law is hence predicated on the 
international rule-making process that has been explained above. There cannot be 
institutionalization without a generally available rule-making process. There is, 
however, a template that guides the requisite rule-making. That template foresees rules 
on starting and ending the institution, and what the legal consequences are. These may 
be labelled the institutive, the terminative, and the consequential rules of the institution. 
Full institutionalization happens where rules are underpinned by machinery for judicial 
or quasi-judicial interpretation and application.  
Extant institutions of contemporary international law revolve around agencies (1), 
law-making arrangements (2), and master-norms to direct the development of 
international law (3). 
 Institution-Agencies 
International law institutionalizes organizations whose purpose it is to act on the 
international plane. These organizations may be labelled institution-agencies.113  
The sovereign State is the primary agency of international law. It is the residual 
holder of competences. The international law of the State follows the template of 
institutive, terminative and consequential rules, laid down in customary law. The 
institutive rule for statehood pertains to the three elements of effective government over 
a people on a territory. This rule is underpinned by the principle of self-determination 
of peoples. The principle normatively anticipates lacking effective control in 
decolonization contexts. In a non-colonial context, self-determination may come to 
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underpin the claim of a people to statehood.114 It then needs to be balanced with the 
countervailing principle of the territorial integrity of the extant State. Conflicts between 
two countervailing principles are reconciled through political or judicial channels.115 
Statehood may be terminated, by the people, triggering State succession rules. The 
consequences of statehood are international legal subjectivity and sovereignty. 
Sovereignty denotes the bundle of competences that each State holds. Comprised is the 
competence to engage in international rule-making and jurisdiction to apply and 
enforce international law with effect to the territory. The domaine réservé competence 
over internal matters is dispositive.116 These are complemented by functionally 
delimited competences over portions of the oceans, of the flag in areas beyond national 
jurisdiction, and also over disputed land territory.117 States generally hold these 
competences for autonomously determined priorities, yet increasingly they must 
exercise them for internationally determined priorities.118 These competences are then 
protected against interference by other States. International rules prohibit 
transboundary physical harm, intervention, the use of force and any other interference 
with its political independence or territorial integrity. 
Intergovernmental international organizations are secondary agencies. Their point is 
to organize cooperation of States on common interests. Under the institutive rules for 
all international organizations, States must agree to set them up and confer on them 
competences for achieving specific objectives. States remain free to terminate any 
international organization. The principal legal consequence is that the international 
organization enjoys autonomy in rule-making, application and enforcement. It is placed 
above the members in the sense that these have to carry out the law of the organization 
in good faith. This hierarchy is reversed where States direct the organization through 
treaty change or other means. The point of organizing international cooperation can, 
however, also be realized in the alternative formation of the meeting of the parties to 
multilateral treaties, with the consequence that these fulfil substantial quasi-legislative 
functions in developing and implementing the treaty beyond the traditional confines of 
an international organization: The less autonomous formation ends up holding more 
authority. 
 Institution-Arrangements: The Role of the Law of Treaties 
Institution-arrangements share the point that they are not agencies in themselves, but 
result from their acts.119 From the acts of States and international organizations result 
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treaties. As codified in the VCLT, the law of treaties becomes the principal institution-
arrangement of the contemporary, treatified international law. 
The VCLT defines the template for the life-cycle of treaty. It determines how to 
institute and terminate treaty. The Convention’s rules apply to the substantive treaty by 
default, unless that treaty specifically derogates from them. The VCLT overarches all 
treaties.120 It ensures the autonomy of treatified international law.121  
It also prescribes the consequence of treaty, and hence the four characteristics of 
treaty-based international law: pacta sunt servanda, systemic unity, effet utile and 
dynamic development, and rights of individuals. Art. 26 of the VCLT enshrines the 
bindingness of a treaty, with supremacy over domestic law (Art. 27) and regional 
law.122 Art. 42 shores this up, mandating that a treaty can be impeached only under 
certain conditions. In Art. 31 (3) (c), the VCLT secures the systemic unity of all treaty-
based international law. It is the lever to internalize rules from separate and independent 
treaties, within the limit of the wording. The prioritization of object and purpose of the 
treaty among the means of interpretation injects dynamism, again within the terms 
used.123 Parties can also change the treaty through subsequent agreement, explicitly or 
through concordant practice.124 Finally, all treaties are susceptible of conferring rights 
and obligations on individuals. Those are normally justiciable before international 
courts, such as the ICJ. The point of LaGrand is precisely this: the State may bring an 
action to enforce rights of the individual created by a treaty that traditionally had been 
considered as creating rights only between the parties. 125 
Effective, effet utile orientated approaches to treaty are grounded in Art. 31 (1) of 
the  VCLT, which makes ‘object and purpose’ of the substantive treaty the paramount 
reference of the entire interpretative exercise. One has to focus on the legislative 
programme of the treaty, rather than the object and purpose of its individual provisions. 
This focus goes beyond the established interpretive principle of effectiveness, 
understood as the technique that the interpreter of a treaty must normally seek to give 
the terms of each treaty provision a meaning which leads them to have practical 
effect.126 That legislative programme is to be ascertained from the treaty preamble, 
which otherwise only has the contextual weight that Art. 31 (2) of the VCLT accords 
it. The recent jurisprudence has driven forward the paramountcy of the legislative 
programmes. In the case of UNCLOS, the 2012 Territorial and Maritime Dispute case 
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has powerfully effectuated the legislative programme of the Convention. There, the ICJ 
referenced the preamble that UNCLOS is to establish the legal order of the oceans. It 
concluded that meant that Nicaragua as a State party had to apply the Convention rules 
regarding the outer continental shelf and to submit its claim to the Continental Shelf 
Commission in the instance, even though Colombia was not a party.127 This 
interpretation affects the role that the consent of each party to a treaty has. Any such 
consent has been thought to be limited, ratione personae, temporae, and materiae.128 
But effective and uniform application requires that a party apply the treaty beyond these 
limits. Thus, it must apply the treaty irrespective of whether the contesting other State 
is also bound to do so. In that case, the Court also effectuated UNCLOS, Art. 121 on 
islands, which as indissociable regime crystallized into custom, including its third 
paragraph on the own continental shelf of each island, regardless of whether that rule 
actually was supported by State practice.129 In the 2012 Maritime Dispute case between 
Peru and Chile, the Court effectuated a UNCLOS legislative programme of universal 
rules. The Court prioritized the Convention’s general rules of equidistance, special 
circumstances and proportionality for overwhelming maritime zone at issue. By 
contrast, the specific bilateral delimitation agreement between the parties was 
interpreted restrictively.130 The evolutive interpretation ensures that the treaty 
programme itself can adapt to subsequent broader developments in international law 
unforeseeable at the time of adoption can still be covered. In Navigational Rights the 
Court expressly favours the evolutive interpretation of a bilateral treaty on commercial 
river navigation so that it covers the progressive development of international 
economics and law since its inception.131  
The judgment in Obligation to Prosecute effectuates the legislative programme of 
the UN Convention against Torture (CAT). The case concerned the requested 
extradition of former dictator Habré from Senegal to Belgium under the CAT. The 
Court referred to the preamble to opine that the Convention’s objective was to render 
the fight against torture more effective. This finding then informed both procedure and 
substance. Procedurally, it meant that each State Party can invoke instances of non-
compliance by any other so that Belgium had standing to invoke the CAT qua being a 
party even though no national was concerned.132 Substantively, the Court read preamble 
and key provisions together to conclude that the Convention establishes a mechanism 
for effectively combating torture, with the concrete consequence that Senegal had to 
prosecute the alleged torture case and could not simply choose extradition.133 The Court 
then also ensured that the thus determined programme was uniformly applied over time. 
The Court stressed that States Parties could not prosecute acts committed before the 
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entry into force of the convention for them.134 But it made clear that the torture 
prohibition was enshrined in customary law so that each State could prosecute.135 The 
Court has also effectuated the programme of the Genocide Convention. In the Bosnia 
case, it read into it a prohibition for States Parties to commit genocide, in addition to 
their expressly stipulated obligation to criminalize the individual commitment of 
genocide.136 This renders the Genocide Convention effective in protecting human 
dignity.137  
 Institution-Norms 
In addition to institutionalizing agencies and arrangements, international law also 
institutionalizes its meta-norms. Meta-norm is a value-bound, evaluative concept. Such 
master-norms are situated at a level of abstraction above international rules and 
principles. A master-norm then embodies a value applicable horizontally to the whole 
or most of international law. As such master-norms currently arguably qualify 
sustainable development,138 international security,139 and human dignity.140  
A master-norm is not rule-producing by itself, though. Rather, it is operationalized 
pursuant to a general template. The template calls for the master-norm to be articulated 
through an agenda-setting UN conference and then to be formalized in a central 
multilateral treaty aspiring to universal membership, either as a stand-alone convention 
or as a framework convention-cum-implementing treaty.141 Thus, global security is 
centred on the UN Charter, sustainable development of the oceans on UNCLOS and 
that of the climate on the UNFCCC142, and human dignity in the UN Covenants and 
supplementary human rights treaties. These multilateral treaties institute general rules, 
removing the power to make reservations that States by default hold under the  
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VCLT.143 They substitute uniform rules for the particular-plural ordering of 
international matters.144 They establish machinery for centralized rule-making on 
harmonization, coordination or mutual recognition of domestic law, and for centralized 
application and enforcement.145 They also allocate to parties international legal powers 
to apply these rules. The multilateral treaty may then be further implemented by parties 
entering into bilateral and regional treaties.  
As a consequence, the master-norm becomes the institutional context for all treaties 
within its ambit. This calls for the foundational multilateral treaty to be integrated with 
all other applicable treaties. The following discussion highlights how the recent 
international jurisprudence reflects this approach, selectively for the master-norms of 
international security and human dignity. 
The master norm of international security is founded in the UN Charter. The Charter 
sets forth the supporting principles in Art. 2, on sovereign equality, pacific settlement 
of disputes, the prohibition to use force, and the self-determination of peoples. The ICJ 
has integrated those principles with other treaties external to the Charter. This is well 
illustrated by two cases concerning the 1955 Treaty of Amity between Iran and the US. 
There, the UN Charter bears on the interpretation of that treaty’ exemption clause for 
national security measures. In the 2003 case Oil Platform, the Court construed this 
clause narrowly to comply with Art. 51 UN Charter on self-defence and Art. 2 (4) on 
non-use of force.146 In the 2018 provisional measures of Iran v US, the Court has 
construed the clause equally narrowly to comply with the demand for humanitarian 
relief.147  
A similar approach of integrating the Charter with external treaties has been adopted 
by other international courts. In Polisario, the European Court of Justice gave effect to 
the principle of self-determination for a treaty on trade and development concluded by 
the European Union with Morocco.148 Referring to the ICJ jurisprudence, the ECJ 
classified self-determination as an erga omnes principle of international law. It deduced 
the presumption that States and international organizations such as the EU intend to act 
consistently with this principle. The Court then turned the VCLT into an instrument to 
effectuate this presumption. Thus, the Convention’s third-party rule means here that the 
parties cannot have intended to extend the treaty to the territory belonging to the people 
of West Sahara. And the Convention’s later-in-time rule means here that the parties 
cannot have intended for the earlier treaty that was consistent with self-determination 
to have been modified by later agreements. 
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The Sadio Diallo judgments demonstrate how the International Court of Justice 
pursues this integrating approach to the master norm of human dignity and the 
supporting human right law. The Court found that the human right to liberty of Mr 
Diallo could be enforced through diplomatic protection by his State of nationality 
against a host State.149 In ruling on the merits, the Court then shaped a single standard 
of unlawful detention from a synopsis of the universal UN Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights with regional human rights treaties, integrating these instruments.150  
V. Conclusions 
This article has cast a particular light on how international lawyers ought to think about 
their subject, without aiming to revisit all theoretical work where international lawyers 
discuss the project of international law. It has spelled out an analytic perspective 
building on MacCormick’s insights, making visible that international law forms an 
institutional normative order directing States in the conduct of international affairs. 
If this idea of institutional normative order describes the essence of international law 
convincingly, then it is indeed a system contrary to Hart’s criticism, unifying its 
increasingly specialized subject-matters. Order becomes the overarching function for 
all international law. An international rule-making process embedded in practice serves 
to turns norms into binding international rules. This process formalizes the rules 
through treaties and alternatives such as resolutions, institutional decisions and expert 
texts. It also organizes their authorization through collective consent of States while 
individual consent authorizes the rule for that State. The produced international rules 
in all areas are applied through international legal powers, with the exercise of a power 
by a State being contestable and increasingly subject to judicial control as to lawfulness. 
And international law has institutionalized the agencies––the State and international 
organizations––, the legal arrangements––treaty––, and the master-norms of 
sustainable development, international security and human dignity that integrate all 
international rules.  
This unity entails obvious methodological consequences. International lawyers 
cannot see any part of international law in isolation of the whole, but rather each part 
must be seen as operating in this institutional order. The burden of argumentation is on 
those wishing to dispute that in any specific field the defining features do not apply. 
The rule-making process formalizes rules increasingly through alternatives to treaty, 
collective authorization, and these rules confer a power on States that they apply under 
a defeasible presumption of legality and generally applicable constraints. This burden 
is also on those wishing to argue that the institutions of international law and its master 
norms and foundations in multilateral treaties do not extend to a given matter. 
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